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STATE-CREATED PROPERTY
I. INTRODUCTION
In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, the Supreme
Court significantly limited the reach of the Equal Protection Clause
as a tool for public employees to challenge their treatment by state
officials.' The case arose when Anup Engquist, an employee of the
Oregon Department of Agriculture (the ODA), sued the ODA and her
supervisors after she was laid off.2 Ms. Engquist sought to rely on
the Supreme Court's equal protection ruling in Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech,8 among other grounds for relief.4 In Olech, the
village of Willowbrook demanded a thirty-three-foot easement from
the Olechs as a condition of connecting their house to the municipal
water supply.' The Olechs brought an equal protection suit, in
which Ms. Olech offered to show that others in a similar situation
had been obliged to grant only a fifteen-foot easement.6 The Court
held that the Olechs' complaint was "sufficient to state a claim for
relief," and that an equal protection claim could successfully be
raised by a" 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that he or she
has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment."7
Armed with Olech, Ms. Engquist challenged her dismissal under
the "class-of-one" theory and won a substantial jury verdict.' Ms.
Engquist argued that she was fired not because of her race, national
origin, or sex-as would ordinarily be argued in an equal protection
claim-but "simply for 'arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious
reasons.'" The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, finding
that the class-of-one theory did not apply to Ms. Engquist's case.9
The Supreme Court heard the case on appeal, in which Chief Justice
128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
2 Id. at 2149.
3 Id. at 2150.
4 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
5 Id. at 563.
6 Id.
Id. at 564-65.
8 Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2150. Engquist asserted other state and federal claims as well,
but the only issue decided by the Supreme Court was the viability of the class-of-one equal
protection claim. Id. at 2148-50.
9 Id. at 2148.
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Roberts, writing for the majority, affirmed.'" He explained that the
class-of-one suit is unavailable to plaintiffs like Ms. Engquist
because "employment decisions are quite often subjective and
individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to
articulate and quantify."" The Chief Justice reasoned that, by
contrast, Olech provided "a clear standard against which departures,
even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed." 2 Thus, the
Engquist Court held that the " 'class-of-one' theory of equal
protection has no place in the public employment context."
3
The Engquist holding, however, likely extends to claims other
than those involving public employment. One can think of many
"forms of "state action . . . which by their nature involve
discretionary decisionmaking." 4 Under Engquist's reasoning, class-
of-one equal protection claims may be excluded when the challenged
state action involved an "array of factors" which influenced the
decision and lacked a clear standard, such as that which made the
Olechs' class-of-one claim successful. 15
This Article addresses whether someone in Ms. Engquist's
position has a substantive constitutional alternative to the class-of-
one theory for pursuing claims of wrongful treatment after the
Engquist decision. Although state law or a federal statute may offer
some protection, we are only concerned with federal constitutional
rights. We conclude that the best alternative arises from the Due
Process Clause. 6
It is well settled that some state benefits-building permits,
liquor licenses, and certain jobs-are forms of property protected by
the Due Process Clause. Case law and commentary on the Due
Process Clause generally focus on two elements to find a violation:
10 Id.
12 Id. at 2154.12 Id. at 2153.
13 Id. at 2148-49.
14 Id. at 2154.
" Some lower courts have already begun to expand the Engquist principle. Compare SBT
Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 547 F.3d 28,34-35 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding class-of-
one complaint after Engquist decision without actually citing to Engquist), with Douglas
Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (extending Engquist's holding
to government-contractor relationship).
16 The Due Process Clause grants procedural rights only to persons whose life, liberty, or
property are at stake. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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first, whether a given benefit amounts to property, and second, what
procedural safeguards must be provided before the state takes the
benefit away. 7 In the wake of Engquist, yet another issue may come
to the fore-whether the plaintiff may assert a substantive due
process claim in addition to a procedural due process claim. Few
litigants have asserted substantive due process claims in recent
years, possibly for two reasons: first, an equal protection class-of-
one claim was available until taken away by Engquist, and second,
because the Court has expressed reluctance to expand the scope of
substantive due process if an alternative is available."8 Because
Engquist has severely limited the availability of the class-of-one
claim, a compelling case can be made for expanding the scope of
substantive due process.
Consider the following hypothetical case:
Amy is a tenured professor at a state university. As a
tenured professor, she may only be fired for cause under
state law. On these facts, it is settled law that Amy has
a state-created property interest in her position. Joe, the
17 A recent example of the Court's property jurisprudence is Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, in which the Court held that the plaintiff had no property interest in enforcement
of a restraining order. 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005). There is also an extensive body of scholarship
regarding the Court's property jurisprudence. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape
of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000) (evaluating property jurisprudence under
Due Process Clause and Takings Clause); Timothy P. Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and
the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861,861 (1982)
(discussing government entitlements and their status as protected property under Due Process
Clause, and arguing Court should adopt "a more rigorous definition of property").
The most recent Supreme Court decision discussing the procedural requirements of the
Due Process Clause is Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). Wilkinson involved a
deprivation of liberty rather than property, but the Court does not distinguish between the two
for purposes of procedural due process. Wilkinson reaffirms the basic principles first
enunciated in an earlier property case, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224-25.
" See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-95 (1989) (favoring Fourth or Eighth
Amendment grounds for relief over substantive due process grounds); see also Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 287-88 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) ("We are . . . required ... to
exercise care whenever we are asked to break new ground in [the] field' of substantive due
process." (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))). Our argument is not
to the contrary. Rather, we maintain that on certain facts there may be no alternative to the
substantive due process theory. Moreover, the Court recognizes that in such circumstances,
substantive due process is the appropriate avenue for relief. See County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) ("Substantive due process analysis is therefore inappropriate
in this case only if respondents' claim is 'covered' by the Fourth Amendment.").
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school president, informs her that a student has accused
her of violating the school's sexual harassment policy.
School authorities investigate the charge, and Amy is
afforded a hearing before Joe to determine whether she
should be dismissed. For the sake of isolating the
substantive issue, let us assume that she receives all of
the procedural protections demanded by the Due Process
Clause. 9  At the hearing, Amy undermines the
credibility of the accuser, presents witnesses who provide
her with an airtight alibi, and generally makes a
compelling case that the accusations are false.
Nonetheless, Joe rules that she has violated the policy,
revokes her tenure, and fires her. Amy sues Joe and the
university, seeking an injunction against dismissal on
the ground that termination would deprive her of her
state-created property without due process of law.
For the sake of isolating the issue of whether Amy may assert a
substantive claim, we assume that Joe deliberately fired Amy for
reasons of his own, or for no reason at all, but without cause-that
is, he fired Amy with insufficient evidence of incompetence,
insubordination, criminal misconduct, or other grounds that would
justify dismissal.2" We also set aside theories of recovery that rely
on specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the First
Amendment right of free speech.21 Nor are we concerned with the
" In Coronado v. Valleyview Public School District 365-U, for example, a student was
expelled from school for two semesters for participating in a gang fight in the school's
lunchroom. 537 F.3d 791, 792 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In his suit against school officials,
Coronado relied on Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which recognized access to public
education as a property interest. Coronado, 537 F.3d at 795. Coronado's motion for a
preliminary injunction was denied, however, because he received notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, and due process required no more. Id. at 796-97.
20 See Merrill, supra note 17, at 960 (discussing definition of cause).
21 The leading Supreme Court cases on public employee free speech rights are Pickering
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), which establishes a balancing test between
the interests of the employee and employer, and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51
(1983), which emphasizes that the state's interest as employer weighs heavily in the Pickering
balance. Thus, the free-speech basis for recovery has become less available in recent years.
See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding no First Amendment
protection for speech that is part of employee's job); Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 491
(7th Cir. 2008) (holding internal complaint was not protected speech).
166 [Vol. 44:161
STATE-CREATED PROPERTY
substantive due process protection of liberty, such as the freedom of
intimate association22 or the right to personal security from physical
harm caused by conduct that shocks the conscience.23
We argue that the Due Process Clause affords not only procedural
but also substantive protection to Amy's state-created property
interest in keeping her job. Furthermore, while our hypothetical
involves government employment, our thesis extends to a whole
range of state-created property interests, including, among other
things, building permits and liquor licenses. This type of due
process claim has received no systematic attention from the
Supreme Court, and the lower federal courts are divided. The only
circuit court case discussing the matter in detail is McKinney v. Pate,
in which the Eleventh Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs
substantive theory of recovery."' In our view, McKinney is wrongly
decided, and the issue urgently requires a thorough airing.
Part II of this Article lays the foundation for the argument by
briefly describing the Supreme Court's state-created property
doctrine. Parts III and IV then make the case for substantive, as
well as procedural, protection for these rights. Finally, Part V
discusses the specific substantive constitutional norms that ought to
govern state-created property rights. Part VI offers our final
conclusion.
II. STATE-CREATED PROPERTY AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
To persons unfamiliar with the doctrine defining which interests
are property protected by the U.S. Constitution, there is no apparent
similarity between a tenured position at a university; a restraining
order; or termination from a job only for cause, and land, chattels, or
the intangible interests in financial instruments that constitute
property in everyday life and in the common law. Indeed, there was
22 See, eg., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (striking down law that
criminalized homosexual sodomy); Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 941-44 (6th
Cir. 2004) (rejecting high school teacher's argument that denial of tenure because of her
relationship with her student violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to intimate association).
23 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853-55 (1998) (rejecting imposition of
liability on police officer for injuring innocent person in course of high-speed chase, but indicating
that liability would be appropriate if officer's conduct met "shock the conscience" test).
24 20 F.3d 1550, 1567 (llth Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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a time when the Supreme Court would have characterized a
plaintiffs interest in the enforcement of a tenure policy at a
university as a gratuitous benefit from the government or
employer.25 The Court would have characterized it as a "privilege"
and dismissed the plaintiffs case after a cursory glance at the
pleadings.2" But property, like other terms drawn from ordinary
language to express constitutional values, has come to mean more
than land and chattels.
A. BOARD OF REGENTS V. ROTH: THE "NEW PROPERTY"
Over the past forty years, property has become a term of art with
a specialized meaning in constitutional litigation." The Supreme
215 See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918,918 (1951) (upholding, by an equally divided
court, the district court's determination that government employment is a privilege, not a right).
26 See STEVEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 645-69
(4th ed. 1999) (describing the right-privilege distinction); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439-41
(1968) (describing earlier cases in which courts treated variety of government benefits as
"privileges" that could be taken away without judicial oversight). Professor Alstyne's report
of the "demise" of the distinction was, however, premature. The current regime continues to
distinguish between interests that receive constitutional protection and those that do not. See
generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982) (arguing
privilege doctrine has valid basis in procedural due process).
" See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1532 & n.88 (2003)
("[Piroperty is an artifact, a human creation that can be, and has been, modified in accordance
with human needs and values."); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62
CORNELLL. REV. 405,436 (1977) ("[Gliven the purposes behind the protection of'property,' the
word may fairly be held to embrace new forms of property as they emerge.").
Similarly, the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments "presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. Among other things, liberty also embraces the right to
personal security and bodily integrity. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,673 (1977) ("The
liberty preserved from deprivation without due process included the right 'generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.'" (quoting Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))); Hart v. Sheahan, 396
F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The 'liberty' that the due process clauses secure against
deprivation without due process of law includes ... the right to bodily integrity.").
Speech that qualifies for First Amendment protection includes some but not all of what
would be called speech in ordinary language, as well as some acts that would not qualify as
speech in ordinary language. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:
A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773 (2004)
("That the boundaries of the First Amendment are delineated by the ordinary language
meaning of the word 'speech' is simply implausible."). Seizure, for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, includes the use of force to subdue a fleeing or recalcitrant suspect. Graham v.
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Court has recognized property rights in jobs,2" licenses, 29 and other
benefits granted by state and federal statutory law and
administrative practice.3 ° With the growth of the administrative
state in the mid-twentieth century, the danger of government abuse
of authority grew ever larger and state-granted benefits became
increasingly important to the welfare of individuals. 31 As a result,
critics of unbridled state power called for the establishment of
procedural safeguards for these benefits as a form of property,32 and
the Supreme Court responded.33 The leading case, and the starting
point for analysis of the doctrine protecting state-created property,
is Board of Regents v. Roth.34 David Roth was a college teacher on
a one-year contract. 3' After the college informed Roth that it would
not renew his contract, Roth brought a § 198336 suit, alleging that
"the failure of University officials to give him notice of any reason for
nonretention and an opportunity for a hearing violated his right to
procedural due process of law."37  The Supreme Court ruled that
Roth had no property interest in his teaching position that was
protected by procedural due process and therefore no right to notice
and a hearing.38
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Punishment, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, covers
deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102-05 (1976). It also covers deliberate indifference to inmates' need for protection from other
inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994).
' See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (recognizing
property right in some types of public employment); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)
(same).
29 See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (finding property in state-issued horse
racing license).
' See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,332 (1976) (holding plaintiffhad property-
right continuation of disability benefits).
" See Charles E. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964) ("Increasingly,
Americans live on government largess-allocated by government on its own terms, and held
by recipients subject to conditions which express 'the public interest.' ").
32 For the most powerfully argued, and the most influential, critique, see generally id.
' See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. For a description of the evolution of the
property prong of the Due Process Clause, see Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the
Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1048-69 (1984).
3 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
3 Id. at 566.
36 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 allows a person to bring a civil action against a
government official who deprives that person of"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the constitution and laws...."
3' Roth, 408 U.S. at 569.
8 Id. at 578-79.
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The importance of Roth lies in the reasons the Court gave for
denying Roth's claim. First, it rejected the "right-privilege"
distinction established in its earlier cases. Second, despite finding
Roth had no property interest in his employment, the Court declined
to issue a blanket rule against recognizing property rights in
benefits obtained from the state.39 Instead, it set forth a test for
distinguishing between two types of benefits-those to which the
beneficiary had a legitimate claim of entitlement and those to which
the beneficiary did not.4' "To have a property interest in a benefit,"
the Court explained, "a person.., must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it."41 Whether someone has a legitimate claim of
entitlement depends on the law governing access to the benefit:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits.42
89 Id. at 576-77. For more on the right-privilege distinction, see supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
40 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
41 Id. See also Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of
Roth and Perry, 71 CAL. L. REV. 146, 171-74 (1983) ("[Tlhe Roth definition of 'property' is
consistent with the historical and usual meaning of the word."); A.C. Pritchard, Note,
Government Promises and Due Process: An Economic Analysis of the 'New Property," 77 VA.
L. REV. 1053 (1991) (providing critical economic analysis of Court's doctrine).
42 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Governments may choose whether to set up benefit programs
in such a way as to create entitlements. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of
Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 640-58 (2004) (exploring positive and negative effects
of various approaches).
State law may also create liberty interests. This typically occurs with regard to
prisoners or others who have lawfully been deprived of personal freedom, and usually the
liberty interest will be created by legislation, but other state-law directives may also suffice.
For an example that is somewhat analogous to the "property" claim in Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), see Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1993).
Even when not directly stated, when the state grants prisoners some degree of liberty, the
prisoners may acquire state-created liberty interests. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,484
(1995) (finding that state-created liberty interests "will be generally limited to freedom from
restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life"). Applying this principle, the Court recently held that Ohio
[Vol. 44:161170
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This test for a legitimate claim of entitlement barred Roth's claim
because the terms of Roth's contract "made no provision for renewal
whatsoever," and he therefore "secured absolutely no interest in re-
employment for the next year."43 Moreover, neither state law nor
university rules supported any expectation of renewal." The Roth
decision indicates that the employment-as-property inquiry is likely
to be very fact intensive.
The Court drove this point home in a companion case to Roth,
Perry v. Sindermann." Sindermann, like Roth, was a college teacher
whose one-year contract was not renewed.46 But, unlike Roth,
Sindermann argued that his interest in renewal, "though not
secured by a formal contractual tenure provision, was secured by a
no less binding understanding fostered by the college
administration."47 Specifically, he offered to prove that the college's
practice had been to renew teaching contracts such as his.' For the
purpose of ruling on the college's motion for summary judgment, the
Court held that the plaintiff may, on the basis of "the policies and
practices of the institution," establish a legitimate claim of
entitlement.49 Furthermore, the Court stated that legitimate
reliance is governed by an objective test, and "a mere subjective
'expectancy' is [not] protected by procedural due process.""
inmates have a state-created liberty interest in avoiding confinement in "supermax" prisons.
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-25 (2005).
4' Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
44 Id.
4" 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
46 Id. at 595.
47 Id. at 599-600.
4 Id. at 600. Sindermann claimed to have relied on a provision of the teacher handbook
which stated, inter alia, that faculty members should "feel that [they have] permanent tenure
as long as [their] teaching services are satisfactory. ... ." Id.
41 Id. at 603 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Since Perry, some courts
have held that a property interest can be based on "mutually explicit understandings" between
the employee and a supervisor. Cf Crull v. Sunderman, 384 F.3d 453,464-65 (7th Cir. 2004)
(ruling against plaintiff because she failed to "support her assertion of mutually explicit
understanding of continued employment by offering statements from someone who could bind"
her employer).
50 Perry, 408 U.S. at 603. See also Nunez v. Simms, 341 F.3d 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2003)
(applying an objective test).
2009]
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B. DEFINING "LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS"
Taken together, Roth and Perry established the principle that, for
constitutional purposes, property consists of more than the land,
chattels, and intangibles covered by the common law. These cases
held that government benefits may amount to property within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments if the law governing them gives rise to legitimate
expectations of continuance."' The companion cases set up a
doctrinal framework for determining whether a given government
benefit qualifies as property entitled to due process protection.
Usually, though not always, the governing law will be state
law-hence the characterization of this type of property as "state-
created" property interests. It is this type of protected
constitutional right on which we focus.
The Supreme Court has elaborated these principles and applied
them to a variety of claimed property interests. In the employment
context, the Court has established that those government employees
who may be fired only for cause have a property interest in their
positions that entitles them to due process. 3 Whether the employee
51 A distinct issue, and one that we do not address here, is whether some employment
action other than dismissal taken against the plaintiff amounts to a 'deprivation" of property.
See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924,928 (1997) (declining to address the issue); Barrows
v. Wiley, 478 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that placing an employee on administrative
leave is not deprivation of property when employee had stepped down from prior position);
Col6n-Santiago v. Rosario, 438 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that officers who are removed
from politically sensitive positions when new political party takes power are not deprived of
property).
2 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748,758-65 (2005) (holding plaintiff
had no property interest in enforcement of restraining order in part because Colorado law
did not provide such an entitlement). Federal law may also create property interests,
particularly in cases arising in federal enclaves like the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Griffith
v. Lanier, 521 F.3d 398, 401-04 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (determining that D.C. law did not confer any
protected tenure on volunteer members of police reserve corps).
13 See, e.g., Homar, 520 U.S. at 928-29 ('[Plublic employees who can be discharged only
for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired
without due process .... " (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972))); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985) (finding civil service employees
"entitled to retain their positions during good behavior and efficient service" had property
rights in continued employment). More recent examples include Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347
F.3d 679, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2003); and Harhay v. Town of Ellington Board of Education, 323
F.3d 206,212 (2d Cir. 2003). This principle may also apply to other contractual relationships.
See Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285 F.3d 646, 652 (8th Cir. 2002) ('It is well settled that
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has a claim of entitlement is "decided by reference to state law...
[and] an examination of the particular statute or ordinance in
question."54
The Supreme Court has sometimes taken a narrow view of state-
created property. In Bishop v. Wood, a city ordinance governing the
plaintiff-employee's employment authorized his dismissal "if he fails
to perform work up to the standard of his classification, or if he is
negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties."" The plaintiff
challenged his termination claiming the ordinance conferred on him
a permanent classification that, combined with his period of service,
gave him a protected property interest under the Due Process
Clause.56 The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the ordinance
as making the plaintiff an at-will employee" who had no property
interest in his job as a police officer."
In other cases, the Supreme Court has declined to extend
constitutional property claims. In Paul v. Davis, the plaintiff argued
that a state official "deprived him of his constitutional rights" by
distributing flyers announcing the plaintiff to be an active shoplifter
when in fact the plaintiffs shoplifting charge had been dismissed.5 9
The Court found that the plaintiff did not have a valid constitutional
claim because "reputation alone, apart from some more tangible
interests such as employment, is [n]either 'liberty' Inior 'property'
[and is not] by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of
a contract with a state entity can give rise to a property right protected under the Due Process
Clause [such as] 'where the contract itself includes a provision that the state entity can
terminate the contract only for cause.'" (quoting Unger v. Natl Residents Matching Program,
928 F.3d 1392, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991))).
' Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,344-45 (1976).
55 Id. at 344.
56 Id. at 341.
57 Id. at 345. The Supreme Court relied on the district court judge to provide an
interpretation of the ordinance since it had no guidance from a North Carolina state court. Id.
58 Id. at 345-47. The Bishop decision has not deterred lower courts from finding that at-
will employment gives rise to a property interest in circumstances that are difficult to
distinguish from Bishop. See, e.g., Relford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 390
F.3d 452,460 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding property interest in job where dismissal was authorized
for "inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination, or violation of law involving moral turpitude"
(internal quotation marks omitted)). For recent lower court opinions strictly applying the at-
will principle, see Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26,33-34 (st Cir. 2004); Crull v. Sunderman, 384
F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 113 (3d
Cir. 2003); and Eddings v. City of Hot Springs, 323 F.3d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 2003).
"9 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
20091
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
the Due Process Clause.""° The Court distinguished the plaintiffs
claim from that in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,6 1 where the plaintiff
claimed a stigma to her reputation as a result of a flyer declaring she
could not be sold alcohol. 2  The Court reasoned that in
Constantineau, the posting by the state official "deprived the
individual of a right previously held under state law"-that is, the
right to purchase or obtain alcohol-and that the plaintiff in Davis
had not suffered a similar deprivation.'
More recently, the Court in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
denied the plaintiffs claim that she had a property interest in the
enforcement of a restraining order against her estranged husband.'
The Court began by pointing out that "a benefit is not a protected
entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their
discretion."6" It then found that a "well established tradition of
police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory
arrest statutes,"66 reasoning that when an arrest is impractical,
Colorado's restraining order statute requires only that officers "seek
a warrant."67 Thus, Ms. Gonzales could not "specify the precise
means of enforcement" required by the Colorado restraining order
statute.8 The "practical necessity of discretion" 9 in enforcing her
restraining order fatally undermined Ms. Gonzales' claim to an
entitlement, because "[sluch indeterminacy is not the hallmark of a
duty that is mandatory.""
60 Id. at 701.
61 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
62 Davis, 424 U.S. at 707--08.
63 Id.
64 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
65 Id. at 756. Part of the Court felt that the governing statute left the police with no
discretion. See id. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Colorado law has quite clearly eliminated
the police's discretion to deny enforcement.").
66 Id. at 760.
67 Id. at 763.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 762.
70 Id. at 763. Writing for the majority in Castle Rock, Justice Scalia also suggested in
dicta that Ms. Gonzales lacked two additional federal constitutional requirements necessary
for her due process claim: the benefit must have an "ascertainable monetary value" and it
cannot be an indirect and incidental consequence of the enforcement of state law against a
third party. Id. at 766-67.
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While the Court took a narrow view of property in Bishop, Davis,
and Castle Rock, it has taken more expansive views in other cases.
In Goss v. Lopez, the Court declared that state laws guaranteeing
access to primary and secondary schooling gave the students a
property interest in education.71 This holding was in response to a
class action filed by Ohio public school students who had been
suspended from school, without a hearing, for ten days for
misconduct.72 In finding that the students had a protected property
interest in their public school education, the Court emphasized that
Ohio had chosen to confer this benefit and that the Ohio public
schools could not take away the students' property interests without
adhering to the "minimum procedures required" by the Due Process
Clause.73 Consequently, "students facing suspension . . .must be
given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing."74
The Court held in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., another
employment case, that property embraces an unadjudicated state-
law cause of action.78 In Logan, the plaintiff was purportedly fired
because of his physical disability.76 A state law, the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Act, provided the plaintiff with the right to
appeal termination at a hearing within 120 days after the employee
brought a charge of unlawful conduct. The hearing was actually
scheduled for 125 days later, depriving the commission of
jurisdiction to hear it. 78  The Court held that the commission's
failure to comply with the 120-day requirement violated the Due
Process Clause because the plaintiff had a property interest in that
process.79  The Court further emphasized that the employee's
property right was not in the existence of the process but rather in
the proper administration of that process. 0
"' 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975).
72 Id. at 569-70.
73 Id. at 574.
14 Id. at 579.
75 455 U.S. 422, 430-32 (1982).
76 Id. at 424-25.
17 Id. at 422.
78 Id. at 426-28.
79 Id. at 428-33.
so Id.
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Finally, in Atkins v. Parker, the Court found that recipients of
food stamps had a property interest in their continuance, though the
government retained the power to modify or abandon the program."'
Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the notice they received from
the state agency regarding changes in federal law that could reduce
or eliminate the food stamps the plaintiffs received. 2 The Court,
declaring the notice adequate, distinguished between "procedural
fairness of individual eligibility determinations" and "legislatively
mandated substantive change in the scope of the entire food-stamp
program" and held that in the latter situation, the "legislative
process provides all the process that is due.""' Nonetheless, the
Court found food-stamp benefits to be statutory entitlements that
are treated as property protected by the Due Process Clause.'
Lower federal courts have decided many more property cases than
the Supreme Court. They have found property interests in liquor
licenses;85 state medical insurance coverage;86 business licenses;87
and, where a business began operating before a license was required,
"the continued operation of an existing business.""8 Even a building
permit can be property, 89 if under state law it may not be canceled"
except for a good reason-a legal norm often expressed by the term
"' 472 U.S. 115, 128-29 (1985) ("[Tjhe ... entitlement [to welfare benefits] did not include
any right to have the program continue indefinitely at the same level, or to phrase it another
way, did not include any right to the maintenance of the same level of property entitlement.").
82 Id. at 119-20.
3 Id. at 116.
8 Id. at 128.
" Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2001). See also Linda L. Munden,
Comment, Retail Liquor Licenses and Due Process: The Creation of Property Through
Regulation, 32 EMORY L.J. 1199, 1209-39 (1983) (describing various courts' approaches to
whether liquor licenses are property).
' See, e.g., Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding plaintiffs had a
property interest in medical plan for which they hoped to qualify).
87 See, e.g., Spinelli v. New York, No. 07-1237-cv, 2009 WL 2413929, at *6 (2d Cir.
Aug. 7, 2009) (holding business license, once granted, to be property interest for purposes of
procedural due process).
Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006).
89 Woodwind Estates v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).
o Some lower courts have held that applicants for benefits, as well as current
beneficiaries, may have property interests in the benefits, but the Supreme Court
has not addressed the issue. For a recent assessment of the case law, see Kapps v. Wing, 404
F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2005). For one case that distinguishes between applicants and
beneficiaries, see Spinelli, 2009 WL 2413929, at *6.
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cause.9 At least one federal court has held that a "constant,
consistent pattern" of decisions by administrative law judges as to
appropriate reimbursement rates under Medicare can create a
property interest on the part of physicians in the rates the
administrative law judges deem appropriate.92 Another court held
that a professor may have a property interest not only in his
employment, but also in his position in a specific department.93
Another court found that a psychiatrist had a property interest in
clinical staff privileges at the Manhattan Psychiatric Clinic, because
of provisions in the clinic's bylaws and its policy and procedure
manual which guaranteed such privileges. 94 Yet another court
determined that an inmate has a property right in the funds in his
institutional account such that the funds cannot be assessed by
prison authorities without notice and a hearing.95 Ultimately, the
case law among the lower courts has borne out the Supreme Court's
assertion in Logan that "the types of interests protected as property
are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating to the whole
domain of social and economic fact."96
III. SHOULD STATE-CREATED PROPERTY RECEIVE SUBSTANTIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION?
Most due process cases, both in the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts, address two issues: whether in a given situation, the
plaintiff has a property interest, and given that the plaintiff has a
property interest, what type of procedural process the plaintiff is
entitled to. In light of the Court's decision in Engquist, we think
that a third issue may also arise: whether, in a given situation, the
" Courts often use the phrase "for cause" across the whole range of state-created property
interests. Thomas Merrill argues that "because the phrase 'for cause' is a term of art with
special relevance in employment cases, it may be desirable to express the root idea behind for-
cause removal somewhat more broadly." He suggests "a phrase such as 'specific condition
justifying termination' rather than 'for cause.'" Merrill, supra note 17, at 960.
Furlong v. Shalala, 156 F.3d 384, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1998).
' See, e.g., Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding this was true
when faculty manual guaranteed department placement).
Greenwood v. N.Y. Office of Mental Health, 163 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998).
9' Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d. 279, 291 (3d Cir. 2008).




state has deprived the plaintiff of a substantive right to property.
Under our proposed approach, a plaintiff would begin by
establishing that the plaintiff has a state-created property interest
within the framework of federal constitutional standards.97 We
argue that the plaintiff who holds state-created property may raise
two constitutional claims: (a) that the plaintiffs right to procedural
due process was denied and (b) that the plaintiff was denied
substantive due process. In this Part, we examine both how this
substantive due process claim would arise and potential problems
with the claim.
A. THE SUPREME COURT ON SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court has not resolved the status of substantive due
process in the state-created property context. There is, however, a
recent Supreme Court case that could be read as having decided the
issue in favor of substantive due process. In City of Cuyahoga Falls
v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, Buckeye sought to build a
low-income housing complex.9" After Buckeye had purportedly met
the building permit requirements, public opposition to the planned
development began to grow.99 The city council still approved the
plan, but the city engineer delayed issuance of the permits pending
the voting results of a city referendum that, if passed, would repeal
the ordinance under which the council had approved the permits. 00
This referendum repealing the ordinance passed.'0 '
Buckeye then sued the city and several city officials under § 1983,
arguing that Buckeye had a state-created property interest in
obtaining building permits once it had satisfied the conditions
mandated by state law, and that the city and its officials deprived
Buckeye of that right when they allowed the referendum to go
forward rather than issuing Buckeye the permits.' 2 The claim was
" See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) ("Process is not an end in itself. Its
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a
legitimate claim of entitlement.").
98 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
9 Id.
100 Id. at 192.
101 Id.
10 Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City ofCuyahoga Falls, 263 F.3d 627, 641 (6th Cir. 2001).
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litigated under substantive due process, and the Sixth Circuit
awarded relief on this ground.' In reversing the Sixth Circuit's
judgment on this issue, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the
existence of a state-created property interest, and addressed the
merits of the substantive due process claim.104 Characterizing the
circumstances of the case as an executive action case,'0 5 the Court
held that "the city engineer's refusal to issue the permits while the
petition was pending in no sense constituted egregious or arbitrary
government conduct."
0 6
One implicit premise of this ruling is that a substantive due
process theory would succeed in the event the city engineer's refusal
had been shown to be sufficiently egregious or arbitrary. The Court
did not merely assume for the sake of argument that the substantive
due process theory was available. A fairer reading of the opinion is
that the Court took for granted that a substantive due process
theory applied to that type of case. It cannot be said, however, that
Buckeye unambiguously resolves the issue. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit in McKinney v. Pate°7 ruled against substantive
due process several years before Buckeye, and the Eleventh Circuit
has not changed its position in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Buckeye.0'
B. MCKINNEY V. PATE: THE LEADING CASE AGAINST SUBSTANTIVE
STATE-CREATED PROPERTY RIGHTS
Lacking explicit guidance from the Supreme Court,' many lower
courts have paid little attention to the substantive dimension of
'03 Id. at 641-44.
104 Buckeye, 538 U.S. at 198.
l" The Court has held in prior cases that in a substantive due process claim where the
offending actor is a government executive, "only the most egregious official conduct can be said
to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional sense.'" Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
106 Buckeye, 538 U.S. at 198.
107 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
108 See infra Part III.3.
"o See Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.3 (10th
Cir. 2003) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has not decided whether a state created property right like
the right to a public education triggers substantive due process guarantees .... "); see also
David H. Armistead, Note, Substantive Due Process Limits on Public Officials' Power to
Terminate State-Created Property Interests, 29 GA. L. REv. 769,779-84 (1995) (discussing lack
of guidance from Supreme Court on substantive due process claims).
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cases like Amy's hypothetical case." °  Those courts that have
addressed the issue are divided on the question of whether the
holders of state-created property are entitled to substantive
constitutional safeguards under the Due Process Clause."'
Moreover, few litigants frame their due process cases in substantive
terms, partly because an equal protection class-of-one claim was
available until Engquist, and partly because the Court has expressed
reluctance to expand the scope of substantive due process if an
alternative is available.' Unfortunately, courts that do recognize
substantive due process claims typically do not defend their
positions. Perhaps the most extensive treatment of the normative
issue is found in McKinney, a case that rejected the substantive due
process theory."3 Accordingly, any defense of the substantive theory
must first address the McKinney decision.
1. McKinney's Holding. Millard McKinney was a county building
official in Osceola County, Florida."' He had a property interest in
the position because, under state law, he could only be removed for
cause." 5 Though his performance evaluations were excellent, the
Board of County Commissioners asked him to resign."' When he
refused, the board fired him, charging that he "had failed to provide
direction to his department and that, as a result, the performance of
the Building Division staff was deficient.""7  One of the board
members who voted to terminate McKinney worked for a
construction subcontractor, and McKinney asserted that the board
member was biased against McKinney "because of McKinney's strict
enforcement of the county's building codes,"" 8 that the "charges
against [him] were pretextual and that the Board therefore fired
[him] without reason."1 9
110 See supra Part I for hypothetical.
. Compare McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (rejecting
substantive due process theory), with Herts v. Smith, 345 F.3d 581, 587 (8th Cir. 2003)
(accepting substantive due process theory).
11 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
113 20 F.3d at 1553.
114 Id. at 1554.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1554 n.4.
118 Id. at 1554.
119 Id. at 1555.
180 [Vol. 44:161
20091 STATE-CREATED PROPERTY 181
Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit abandoned some of its
precedent and held that McKinney's facts did not "give rise to a
substantive due process claim."2 ' In the McKinney opinion, Chief
Judge Tjoflat discusses Bishop v. Wood 2' and Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill'22 in reaching the court's decision. 12 3 He
states:
Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that an
employee with a property right in employment is
protected only by the procedural component of the Due
Process Clause, not its substantive component. Because
employment rights are state-created rights and are not
"fundamental" rights created by the Constitution, they
do not enjoy substantive due process protection.'24
But Bishop and Loudermill do not in any measure support the
proposition for which they are cited. Judge Tjoflat correctly
describes Bishop as a case in which the Court found neither a
"property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment" nor
a "constitutionally protected interest in liberty."'25 Because the
120 Id. at 1553. The specific holding in McKinney was that state-created rights in
employment are not covered by substantive due process. Id. Later Eleventh Circuit cases have
extended the doctrine to other types of state-created property. See, e.g., Lewis v. Brown, 409
F.3d 1271, 1273 (l1th Cir. 2005) ("The list of state-created rights is not limited to tort and
employment law, and has been held by this Court to include land-use rights like the zoning
restrictions at issue here.").
121 426 U.S. 341 (1976). For a discussion of Bishop, see supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
122 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Loudermill involved a § 1983 claim brought by terminated school
district employees. Id. at 536. The Court found the employees did possess "property rights
in continued employment." Id. at 539. However, the Court held that the "pretermination
opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided
by the [applicable] statute" that the plaintiffs received, was all the process that was due. Id.
at 547-48.
123 McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1559-60.
124 Id. at 1560.
121 Id. at 1559. In Bishop, the plaintiff asserted that the dismissal violated his Fourteenth
Amendment liberty because "the reasons given for his discharge were false." 426 U.S. at 349.
Shortly before Bishop, the Supreme Court had rejected that reasoning in Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976). Only where the reasons for the dismissal are made public does the plaintiff
have a case under Paul. Id. at 701-02. In Bishop, "the asserted reasons for the City
Manager's decision were communicated orally to the petitioner in private." 426 U.S. at 348
n.12.
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plaintiff in Bishop held neither a property nor a liberty interest in
his position,'26 the question of whether state-created property
receives substantive constitutional protection did not arise and the
Court did not have to address it. Similarly, in Loudermill, the issue
was whether the plaintiff had a property interest in his job, 127 and if
yes, whether the plaintiff was afforded procedural due process in
connection with his dismissal.'28 Again, substantive due process was
not an issue in the case. 2 ' Given that the Court did not address
substantive due process in either Bishop or Loudermill, it is difficult
to see how the Eleventh Circuit felt its analysis of these cases
supported the conclusion that substantive due process was not an
available claim.
2. Questioning the Eleventh Circuit's Argument. The core of
McKinney's reasoning is that substantive due process does not
protect state-created property rights, but rather only rights created
126 See Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344-49 (finding no such interests).
127 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-41 (discussing whether plaintiffhad "property right[ I
in continued employment").
125 See id. at 542-48 (discussing nature of process afforded plaintiff).
129 See id. at 540-46 (explaining that "categories of substance and procedure are distinct"
and analyzing on procedural grounds). In McKinney, Judge Tjoflat offers two other "distinct
and important" reasons for foreclosing substantive due process claims for violations of state-
created rights. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560. First, Judge Tjoflat opines that the "second error"
in the Eleventh Circuit's prior case law was "that it allows a terminated employee to sue in
federal court under § 1983 before the employee utilizes appropriate, available state remedial
procedures." 20 F.3d at 1560. For this proposition, Judge Tjoflat cited Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113 (1990), which holds that certain procedural due process claims cannot be brought
until the plaintiff has pursued available state remedies. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560 (citing
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125-26). But Zinermon quite explicitly distinguishes between
substantive and procedural due process, and it reaffirms the settled law that, as to a
substantive due process claim, "the constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is
complete when the wrongful action is taken." 494 U.S. at 125. Only after it is established that
no substantive due process claim is available could Zinermon be relevant to McKinney. To
argue that Zinermon supports the rejection of substantive due process is to reason in a circle.
Judge Tjoflat's third "distinct and important" reason for repudiating the earlier
Eleventh Circuit law is that it "provides an inappropriate remedy to pretextually terminated
employees." McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560. The appropriate remedy for procedural violations, he
explains, is "not damages calculated on the employee's potential earnings for the rest of his or
her working life, but rather procedural, equitable remedies: reinstatement and a directive that
proper procedures be used in any future termination proceedings." Id. This is, of course, an
accurate account of damages for procedural due process violations. It is, however, inapposite
to the point for which it is advanced in McKinney because it does nothing toward undermining
the proposition that, in the proper circumstances, a substantive due process theory of recovery
may also be available.
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by the Constitution.3 ° Judge Tjoflat distinguishes between two
types of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment:
The substantive component of the Due Process Clause
protects those rights that are fundamental, that is,
rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
The Supreme Court has deemed that most . .. of the
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are fundamental;
certain unenumerated rights (for instance the
penumbral right of privacy) also merit protection .... A
finding that a right merits substantive due process
protection means that the right is protected against
certain government actions regardless of the fairness of
the procedures used to implement them.'3'
This discussion leads Judge Tjoflat to conclude that "areas in which
substantive rights are created only by state law (as is the case with
tort law and employment law) are not subject to substantive due
process protection under the Due Process Clause because
'substantive due process rights are created only by the
Constitution.' "132 Judge Tjoflat cites Bishop and Roth as the
employment cases and Daniels v. Williams133 as the tort case
supporting this distinction between rights that receive substantive
due process protection and those that do not.
3
130 McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560.
131 Id. at 1556 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For example, in Flaskamp
v. Dearborn Public Schools, 385 F.3d 935, 938 (6th Cir. 2004), a teacher was fired because she
had an affair with a recent graduate and subsequently brought a suit claiming a violation of
her fundamental right of intimate association. The Sixth Circuit upheld the school board's
decision, stating that "the board's action did not 'directly and substantially' affect Flaskamp's
right of intimate association and that the board did not act in an unreasonable manner in
addressing the issue." 385 F.3d at 943.
132 McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)). In Ewing, Justice Powell indeed makes it clear that he
would not extend substantive protection to state-created property rights. 474 U.S. at 229.
This is not concerning, however, because he wrote this opinion alone in a case where the Court
was unanimous. Id.
"3 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The Daniels Court relied prominently on the fact that the
government officer's behavior was negligent, as opposed to willful, in denying the plaintiffs
due process claim. Id. at 331.
13 McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556.
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Bishop and Roth are indeed public employment cases, but neither
of them addressed substantive protection for state-created
property. 3 ' Bishop held that the plaintiff did not have a "legitimate
expectation" of continued employment and hence no property
right;136 Roth focused on procedural due process and said nothing one
way or the other about substantive rights.'37 Daniels v. Williams is
indeed a tort case in which the Court ruled that official negligence
could not support a substantive due process claim. 3 ' But the
Daniels Court did not foreclose the substantive due process approach
for more egregious harms, and the Court in County of Sacramento v.
Lewis-a case decided four years after McKinney-belied Judge
Tjoflat's taxonomy by authorizing substantive due process recovery
in certain cases. 3
9
The McKinney court's inability to find precedent on point
supporting its holding is neither surprising nor, standing alone, fatal
to its ruling. An argument for a contrary outcome would face the
same difficulty, largely because of the Supreme Court's failure to
address the substantive due process issue in a systematic way. The
Court's inattention to the scope of substantive protection for state-
created property rights is regrettable, because it raises basic issues
regarding "the troubled boundary between individual man and the
state."4 ' In a world in which government is "a major source of
wealth," the power of the state is significantly augmented as the
scope of constitutional protection of state-created property
diminishes. 4' However the question is resolved, it deserves to be
aired far more fully than it is in McKinney.
131 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1976).
137 See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
138 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331-33.
131 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998) (stating police officer may be
liable to motorist injured in police chase if conduct "shocks the conscience"). Relying on an
earlier Eleventh Circuit case, Judge Tjoflat asserted that official actions that "shock the
conscience" do not give rise to substantive due process claims. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 n.7
(citing Gilmore v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1511 n.21 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Tjoflat,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 115 (1986)). The Supreme
Court repudiated Judge Tjoflat's dictum in Lewis, 523 U.S. at 834.




IV. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS IN STATE-CREATED PROPERTY
Let us return to Amy's case.'42 The basic issue raised by this
hypothetical is whether Amy, though afforded procedural protection,
may nonetheless object to her dismissal from the university on the
ground that she holds a substantive right not to be fired unless there
is sufficient evidence of cause. We attempt here to resolve the
conflict among lower courts and provide needed guidance because in
the event Amy succeeds, not only will she save her job, but her case
will have a broader impact.
A holding in Amy's favor would imply that the state, in
undertaking to deprive a person of state-created property, is
constrained by some burden of proof. That is, the state would have
to satisfy the cause requirement, which gave rise to Amy's state-
created property right. Such a burden of proof already falls on the
state in criminal cases, as established by In re Winship.4 ' The
Supreme Court, in Kansas v. Crane, stated that "proof of serious
difficulty in controlling behavior" would be necessary in certain civil
commitment proceedings that deprive persons of liberty.'" As the
Court recognized in Crane, the substantive norm that the state may
not deprive a person of liberty is a protected right.'45 We argue that
state-created property deserves similar protections.
Recognizing substantive protection for Amy's right would impose
a burden of proof on the state and establish conditions, in addition
to the procedural requirements, for taking away state-created
property rights. We use Amy's hypothetical to illustrate in broad
terms what is at stake in resolving the question of whether the Due
Process Clause guarantees state-created property rights substantive,
as well as procedural, protection. If the Due Process Clause provides
142 See supra Part I for Amy's hypothetical case.
143 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (discussing "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal cases, and finding that the standard is used to protect liberty of defendant and to
command respect of community).
144 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). See also Brock v. Seling, 390 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding that Crane requires "only 'some' showing of an abnormality that makes it 'difficult,
if not impossible for the dangerous person to control his dangerous behavior' " (citing
Crane, 534 U.S. at 411)).
1 See 534 U.S. at 409 ("This case concerns the constitutional requirements substantively
limiting the civil commitment of a dangerous sexual offender....").
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only procedural safeguards, and Amy is afforded those safeguards,
she has no constitutional grounds for complaining about the
substantive deprivation she suffers when she is fired. If, however,
the Due Process Clause obliges the state to produce some quantum
of evidence demonstrating that there is cause for her dismissal, then
Amy's state-created property right in her job necessarily must
receive substantive protection under the Due Process Clause.
We have kept our hypothetical as simple as possible in order to
avoid complications that may distract attention from the central
issue of whether courts should erect substantive constitutional
bulwarks against the deprivation of state-created property rights.
While Amy's case includes the basic features of many substantive
state-related property cases, other cases vary from her case along
two dimensions. First, the plaintiff may advance a more complex
constitutional claim, asserting not merely that the evidence was
insufficient (which is our focus), but that the adverse decision was
based on animus toward her, was arbitrary, or manifested callous
indifference to her rights.' We will argue that Amy should win in
all of these cases. Second, the issue of substantive safeguards arises
not only in the employment context, but also in connection with the
whole range of state-created property: building permits, zoning
variances, and liquor licenses. Thus, under our reasoning, plaintiffs
in all of these cases should have access to the substantive theory of
recovery.
A. MAKING THE CASE FOR SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION
The holding in McKinney rests on two premises: that the state-
law pedigree of property justifies less constitutional protection;'47
and that process and substance can properly be divorced from one
another, with the former receiving constitutional protection but the
14 See Ginaitt v. Haronian, 806 F. Supp. 311, 315-16 (1992) (finding that arbitrary
employment decisions or those based on animus may implicate Constitution).
141 See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (1994) (holding substantive due process does
not apply to state-created rights). For a somewhat different, or at least less definitive
distinction, between fundamental property rights-which receive substantive due process
protection-and other property rights-which do not-see Independent Enterprises v.
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, 103 F.3d 1165, 1179-80 (3d Cir. 1997).
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latter not.148 Thus, two challenges exist for plaintiffs like Amy in
establishing a valid substantive due process claim for state-created
property. First, Amy must show that substantive protection extends
not only to fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution, but
also to state-created property. Second, Amy must show that
procedural safeguards are inadequate by themselves to protect the
substantive aspect of state-created property. Both premises of
McKinney seem problematic and do not bar a substantive due
process claim by a plaintiff holding a state-created property interest.
1. "Fundamental" vs. "State-Created" Rights. In distinguishing
between fundamental rights created by the Constitution on the one
hand, and state-created rights on the other, the Eleventh Circuit in
McKinney necessarily implies that the latter have a lower status by
virtue of their state-law origin. Degrading state-created rights in
this way ignores the core principle, reaffirmed in Castle Rock, that
whether expectations generated by state law give rise to a property
interest is ultimately an issue of federal constitutional law.149
Calling them state-created rights is useful shorthand, but the
moniker misleads by failing to acknowledge the federal
constitutional screen through which they must pass in order to win
protection under the Due Process Clause. For example, the federal
requirements may thwart protection for a given interest due to lack
of monetary value or the incidental or indirect nature of the
protection. 5 ° Given the federal law overlay, it follows that property
interests that satisfy the constitutional norms cannot be
distinguished from other forms of property (like fundamental rights)
simply because of their state-law origins.
By ignoring this federal law component, the McKinney court's
distinction between state and constitutional rights lacks
justification. The universe of rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be divided into state-created rights in
8 See McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560-61 (finding procedural remedy to be available only for
deprivation of state-created right).
149 See supra Part II.B.
0 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005) (finding no state-created
property right under federal Constitution when enforcement of the restraining order was
discretionary). Justice Scalia evidently thought that discretion was fatal to the property claim
in Castle Rock, though it appears he could not muster a majority for that view. See supra note
69 and accompanying text.
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government benefits (which receive only procedural protection) and
rights "created" by the Constitution (which alone are entitled to
substantive protection). This distinction ignores the largest class of
property rights not created by the Constitution-those rights in
land, chattels, and intangibles that are defined by the common law.
For the most part, the existence and scope of common law property
rights are governed by state law, yet the Due Process Clause and the
Takings Clause protect common law property against substantive,
as well as procedural, violations.'51
Stated in abstract terms, the property component of the Due
Process Clause addresses the constitutional problem created by the
tension between persons in a free society entitled to rely on keeping
rights they have acquired, and the government seeking (for good or
bad reasons) to take those interests away.5 2 Starting with Roth, the
guiding principle for property cases has been the Court's
understanding that "a purpose of the ancient institution of property
is to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined."5 ' For hundreds
of years, the common law has preserved interests in land, chattels,
and intangibles, and the Due Process Clause, and the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment safeguard these common-law
property interests against legislatures and officials.M With the
growth of the state in the second half of the twentieth century came
the "emergence of government as a major source of wealth," in the
form ofjobs, contracts, licenses, permits, and the like.'55 In Roth and
"' See, e.g., Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) (applying Due Process Clause to real
property); Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, 236 F.3d 240, 248-49 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that
substantive due process may apply to taxation of real property); Clark v. City of Draper, 168
F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that arbitrary deprivation of property may trigger
substantive component of Due Process Clause).
152 This is the central insight driving Charles A. Reich's The New Property, a highly
influential pre-Roth article that made the case for treating state benefits as property for
constitutional purposes. See Reich, supra note 31, at 733 ("[IUn a society that chiefly values
material well-being, the power to control a particular portion of that well-being is the very
foundation of individuality."); id. at 764 ("[The growth of largess has made it possible for
government to 'purchase' the abandonment of constitutional rights."); id. at 771 ("[Property
performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by
creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner.").
15 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
z See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
'5 Reich, supra note 31, at 733.
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Sindermann, the Court responded to the transformation by
extending the reach of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment property.'56
Thus, a more accurate account of constitutional property rights
would drop the distinction drawn by McKinney and instead
acknowledge that property has several sources: some of the property
and liberty rights deserving procedural and substantive protection
under the Due Process Clause originate in state law and practice,
while others come from the common law, from the Supreme Court's
understanding of "ordered liberty,"157 or from the notion that, "[a] t
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." 58
Now consider the amount of constitutional protection we should
afford state-created property in particular. State-created property
exists only when a court determines that state law and practice
produce legitimate grounds for reliance on "the security of interests
that a person has already acquired in specific benefits."5 9 Given
such a determination, we do not believe there are plausible grounds
for distinguishing state-created property from any other kind of
property. Thus, the constitutional principle that curbs the
government's power to deprive us of common-law property rights
and fundamental rights applies with equal force to these state-
created benefits. 60 By adopting this approach, a court can recognize
substantive due process claims for state-created property interests
without contravening or altering Supreme Court precedent.
2. Favoring Procedural over Substantive Protection. Another
barrier to substantive protection of state-created property rights is
the argument that the procedural and substantive components of a
15 See supra Part I.A.
157 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951 (1992).
1 Id. at 851.
... Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
'65 We are not alone in finding Judge Tjoflat's reasoning unpersuasive. Long before
McKinney, others had already rejected the distinction Judge Tjoflat would draw in McKinney
between "state-created" property and other kinds of property. See Monaghan, supra note 27,
at 436 ("[Gliven the purposes behind the protection of 'property,' the word may fairly be held
to embrace new forms of property as they emerge."); Reich, supra note 31, at 779 ("Once
property is seen not as a natural right but as a construction designed to serve certain




right operate autonomously, and that state-created rights enjoy only
procedural protection.161 McKinney's treatment of state-created
property concedes that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
embrace state-created interests, but then it limits the reach of the
Constitution by recognizing only procedural rights for protection. As
justification for excluding the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause, McKinney quotes Collins v. City of Harker Heights'62
for the proposition that
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area
are scarce and open-ended. The doctrine of judicial self-
restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this
field.163
A difficulty with McKinney's reliance on this case is that the
Supreme Court in Collins addressed a different issue altogether from
the one presented by McKinney. In Collins, a city employee
complained that city officials showed deliberate indifference to his
health by exposing him to dangerous working conditions, and that
this amounted to a substantive due process violation.'64 The Collins
Court did not reject substantive due process in principle but ruled
that the alleged misconduct at issue could not "properly be
characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional
sense."'65 Collins was not a case in which the Supreme Court favored
procedural over substantive due process. Rather, the issue in Collins
was whether the plaintiffs claim met the threshold for obtaining any
degree of constitutional protection-procedural or substantive. The
Court ruled that it did not.
66
"' See, e.g., McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994) (making this
argument).
162 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
16 McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S.
at 125).
'64 Collins, 503 U.S. at 17.
'6 Id. at 128.
'66 Id. at 127-30. The Collins Court also stated that a safe work environment was not part
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A different issue is presented in cases like McKinney and in our
Amy hypothetical.'67 The issue in cases like these is whether an
interest that definitively qualifies as state-created property under the
Court's criteria-and hence deserves some constitutional
safeguards-should nonetheless be denied substantive protection. In
concrete terms, the issue is whether Amy, having established that
she holds a state-created property interest and having received a
procedurally flawless due process hearing, has any recourse when she
can show that there was too little evidence to support Joe's finding of
cause. This issue undermines McKinney's reliance on Collins for the
proposition that the Court disfavors substantive protection.
Besides favoring procedural protection over substantive
protection of state-created property, the Eleventh Circuit in
McKinney also distinguishes between challenges to legislation, for
which it found substantive due process available, and challenges to
executive acts (like Amy's claim).'68 The distinction drawn by
McKinney between legislation and executive acts is faulty for at least
two reasons. First, it may not be tenable after County of Sacramento
v. Lewis.'69 In Lewis, the Court declared that "due process protection
in the substantive sense limits what the government may do in both
its legislative and its executive capacities." 7 ° This statement
appears to contradict directly (and thereby eliminate) the distinction
that was drawn in McKinney.
Second, McKinney's distinction seems to ignore the constitutional
values at stake, and the way those values vary in strength
depending on whether legislation or executive action is at issue.
Broadly speaking, legislation is typically enacted by a group (for
example, a city council or a state legislature) and hence is unlikely
of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
167 See supra Part I for facts of hypothetical.
'6 20 F.3d at 1557 n.9. The distinction between the legislative and executive contexts is
explored at length in Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 738-39 (4th Cir. 1999). See also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 326-27 (1993) ("[A] striking disparity has
developed: substantive due process review is harder to obtain, and occurs under less clear
standards, in tort actions based on relatively isolated official acts than in challenges to rules
and legislation.").
169 523 U.S. 833 (1999).
170 Id. at 846 (citation omitted). The viability of McKinney, therefore, depends on the
further distinction between state-created property rights and other rights.
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to reflect the bad motives of a few decision makers. Moreover,
legislation will usually affect many people in approximately the
same way. For these reasons, the democratic process will ordinarily
serve as a check on abusive legislation, and judges should and do
practice self-restraint (verging on self-abnegation), except for in a
small category of "fundamental rights" cases. 7' In the executive
context, however, a given decision will often affect only one or a few
people, and the decision is made by one or a small number of
officials. The potential for abuse and the need for judicial oversight
is greater in this context. 172 Yet, this is the type of case McKinney
denies the protection of substantive due process.
B. DO PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS SUFFICE?
In our view, the strongest defense of the McKinney approach is
not found in its reasoning or in the cases Judge Tjoflat cited. In
short, we do not think that McKinney's reasoning holds up under
scrutiny. Only the Eleventh Circuit in McKinney and cases applying
McKinney defend the "no substantive claim" rule.'7 ' Because
171 Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (upholding state
business regulation in face of due process challenge), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155(1973)
(finding that a regulation limiting fundamental rights, such as the right to have an abortion
under certain circumstances, may be justified only by compelling state interest). While the
Court in recent years has moved away from the term fundamental, it continues to strike down
statutes that interfere with "a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood, as
well as bodily integrity." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)
(internal citations omitted). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking
down statute that interfered with persons' private sexual conduct).
172 See Armistead, supra note 109, at 783 (concluding that abuse is most likely to occur in
non-legislative context). The Third Circuit also distinguishes between executive and
legislative actions. Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, however, the Third Circuit does not preclude
substantive due process claims arising from executive actions. Stockham Interests, LLC v.
Borough of Morrisville, No. 08-3431, 2008 WL 4889023, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2008)
(discussing Third Circuit law in this area). It allows such claims (thereby providing judicial
oversight) and applies the "shock the conscience test." See id. at *6-8. When evaluating
legislative actions, however, the Third Circuit requires the government to "point to a legitimate
state interest rationally served by the ordinance." Id. at *8.
173 We have conducted an exhaustive search of district and circuit court opinions without
finding support for the reasoning in McKinney. See also Kenneth Bley, Use of the Civil Rights
Acts to Recover Damages in Land Use Cases, SM040 ALI-ABA 207 (April 12-14,2007) (listing
McKinney court as only court that "has held that rights created by state law are subject to
procedural, but not substantive, due process protection against nonlegislative action").
Nor do we find any substantial defense of the McKinney rule in scholarly literature. For
example, Thomas Merrill seems to take for granted that state-created property is entitled only
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McKinney's reasoning is infirm, champions of its rule must look
elsewhere for a cogent defense.
The best justification for the "procedural but not substantive
protection" principle lies in the general efficacy of procedural rights
as a means of vindicating substantive rights. For example, one
might maintain that procedural rights are sufficient by themselves
to protect the plaintiffs property interest from the actions of state
actors like our hypothetical Joe, who may threaten it.' 74 In Amy's
case,'75 for example, the procedural due process requirement of an
impartial decision maker will usually be sufficient to prevent her
from being dismissed without a good reason. However, even this
argument falls short. A defender of McKinney could not ignore the
possibility of cases in which a reviewing court would find (a) that Joe
was impartial and (b) that Joe had dismissed Amy without a good
reason. The defender of McKinney, however, would rationalize that
these cases may be rare.'76 In addition, any McKinney defender
to procedural protection, without ever addressing the pros and cons of or citing any authority
for his conclusion. See Merrill, supra note 17, at 916-17, 933, 960.
174 For an illustration of this type of argument in a somewhat different context, see
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). The plaintiff in Hill was a prisoner who claimed
he held a state-created liberty interest in "good time" credits, which are credits given to a
prisoner for good behavior that go toward reducing the overall sentence. Id. at 447. These
credits were taken away from the plaintiff when he was accused of attacking another inmate,
and he sued under§ 1983. Id. at 446. The Court ruled that procedural due process demanded
that the state produce "some evidence" in order to deprive him of the good time credits. Id. at
453. It explained, "Requiring a modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time
credits will help to prevent arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests
or imposing undue administrative burdens." Id. at 455.
Reasoning similar to this may underlie the holding in Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899
(7th Cir. 2005). Tun, a high school student, was expelled from school after another student
photographed him while he was taking a shower. Id. at 900. He sought reinstatement
through the school district's procedures for reviewing decisions of this kind, and he succeeded
after six weeks. Id. at 901. In his § 1983 suit against his principal and hearing officer, he
charged that the expulsion violated his substantive due process rights because the actors
arbitrarily denied him his right to attend school. Id. at 900. Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in
McKinney, the Seventh Circuit recognized the existence of the substantive due process theory
but rejected Tun's claim on the merits, characterizing the school officials' conduct as an
"overreaction" but not a constitutional violation. Id. at 904. The court then commented that
'the situation does demonstrate the importance of providing procedural due process, which
ultimately allowed Tun ... to prevail at the end of the day: his expulsion was set aside, his
school records were cleared, and he returned to school."
17 See supra Part I for hypothetical.
176 In Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, the Eleventh Circuit argues that such
cases do not even exist. Instead of asserting that procedural regularity is sufficient to protect
substantive rights, the Eleventh Circuit reasons that the two are "equivalent":
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would have to concede that while there may be no procedural claim,
a plaintiff charging that a legislative decision has deprived him or
her of property without due process has a substantive claim because
even courts following McKinney allow substantive claims."' v
mhe claim that the government acted arbitrartilly and irrationally can be
easily subsumed and, indeed, is more properly considered a part of a claim
that improper procedures were used in the deprivation. Claiming that the
interest was deprived arbitrarily or irrationally is equivalent to claiming
that no fair, unbiased, and meaningful procedures were used for the
deprivation. That type of inquiry falls squarely within what we have
defined (and clarified explicitly in McKinney) as a procedural due process
claim.
345 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (emphasis added). The problem with
this reasoning is that, according to the Supreme Court, procedural law and substantive law
are conceptually distinct. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) ("The Due
Process Clause... encompasses... a guarantee of fair procedure" as well as "a substantive
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("Ihe Due Process Clause
provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except
pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure
are distinct.").
This is not to say that the two are entirely severable. Procedural law and substantive
law are related in that the "constitutional purpose" of process "is to protect a substantive
interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement." Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). A coherent argument can be advanced that sound procedural rules
provide sufficient safeguards for the substantive rights they aim to protect. That argument
is dealt with in Part III.A. Nevertheless, the "equivalence" theory advanced in Greenbriar
Village fails for a different reason. Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit in Greenbriar Village, an
implication of the Court's conceptual distinction between procedural and substantive rights
is that the latter cannot "be... subsumed" ("easily" or otherwise) into "a claim that improper
procedures were used in the deprivation." Greenbriar Village, 345 F.3d at 1263 n.4. Thus, the
plaintiff may argue that he suffered both a violation of procedural and substantive rights, and
he may win on one, neither, or both claims.
Notice, too, that Greenbriar Village's "equivalence" reasoning does not depend on the
source of the right. Under Greenbriar Village, substantive due process would be "subsumed"
into procedural due process for all claims that involve executive acts depriving the plaintiff of
property or liberty, whether or not the property or liberty right was state-created. Id. at 1263.
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has rejected this view. See, e.g., County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (distinguishing between procedural and substantive due
process "protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government"); Zinermon, 494
U.S. at 126 (addressing plaintiffs procedural claim and noting substantive due process claim
could be read into plaintiffs complaint but that issue was not raised on appeal).
'" McKinney explicitly distinguishes legislative acts from administrative or executive acts
and preserves the substantive due process theory only for the former. McKinney v. Pate, 20
F.3d 1550, 1557 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994). This distinction obliges courts to distinguish on a case-
by-case basis between legislative and executive acts. For a recent example of this case-by-case
distinction, see Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005).
194
2009] STATE-CREATED PROPERTY 195
The force of this "procedure suffices" argument also depends on
an assessment of the costs and benefits of recognizing substantive
claims. One justification of the argument is that authorizing
substantive suits would generate costs and that the costs may not be
worth the marginal benefit of constructing a body of substantive due
process doctrine for vindicating state-created rights. According to
McKinney, one of those costs is the danger of unbridled substantive
due process. That particular argument, however, seems inapposite
to cases like Amy's, where the existence of a substantive property
right has already been established.
The McKinney court also asserts that substantive due process
suits would be "wasteful of judicial resources." 78 It is true that this
type of litigation, like all litigation, adds to the judicial workload, but
that is hardly a reason to single it out for rejection.'79 The Eleventh
Circuit also worries that "subjecting local officials to indiscriminate
blindsiding by their employees" will "encourage them not to fire
anyone for fear of the resulting federal suit."8 ' This concern is not
baseless, as some substantive suits will lack merit and pose the risk
of placing undue burdens on officials called upon to defend them.
178 20 F.3d at 1564. The court further states, "By allowing pretextually terminated
employees to bring substantive due process cases... we encourage employees to sandbag the
decisionmaker by pocketing their objections and then using them as part of a § 1983 case for
damages." Id. This argument seems at odds with Supreme Court doctrine on exhaustion of
remedies and issue and claim preclusion. For instance, in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents,
457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982), the Court rejected the notion that a litigant must first exhaust state
administrative remedies before suing under § 1983, and in University of Tennessee v. Elliott,
478 U.S. 788, 796-99 (1986), the Court held that federal courts should defer to state
administrative agencies' findings of fact only if the state courts would do so.
" As Justice Harlan once noted, the question is how the goal of overseeing state officers
for constitutional violations would "rank on a scale of social values" compared with other uses
of the federal courts. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,410 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring). He continued:
Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days.
Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on
this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative
importance of classes of legally protected interests. And current
limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from
budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to stand in the way of the
recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles.
Id. at 411. In Bivens, the Court allowed a federal suit for damages against federal officers for
Fourth Amendment violations, despite the absence of a federal statute authorizing the cause
of action. Id. at 396-97.
0 McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1564.
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Section 1983 already addresses that problem in the law of official
immunity, which protects officers unless they violate "clearly
established" law.
1 81
By focusing on the costs of allowing substantive due process
claims, McKinney simply ignores the affirmative case for substantive
due process suits for violations of state-created rights. Section 1983
suits serve two related but distinct purposes: vindication of the
plaintiffs constitutional rights and deterrence of constitutional
violations.'82 With regard to the former, the point is to vindicate the
plaintiffs rights by making the plaintiff whole at the expense of the
wrongdoer. The focus is on the case at hand and the demands of
corrective justice.'83 By precluding substantive due process suits,
181 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ('[Olfficials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances."); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."). Legislators,judges, and prosecutors are absolutely immune from suits
for damages. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 385-438 (2d ed. 2004)
(providing framework for determining when legislators, judges, and prosecutors are absolutely
immune). One of the justifications for official immunity is to avoid defining constitutional
rights narrowly. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 78 (1998) (arguing official immunity provides "breathing space" for
constitutional rights that would be lost under strict liability regime).
182 See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,306-07 (1986) (discussing
influence of common law tort principles on damages in Section 1983 claims); Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) ("[Section] 1983 was intended not only to provide
compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against future
constitutional deprivations, as well."); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978)
("The policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of
federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law.");
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978) ("To the extent that Congress intended that
awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence
that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of
compensatory damages."). See also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 ("Having concluded that
petitioner's complaint states a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment... we hold
that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a
result of the agents' violation of the Amendment."); id. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[Tihe Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the
face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities.... ."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non.Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L.
REv. 1731, 1787-88 (1991) ("The Constitution thus contemplates a judicial 'check' on the
political branches not merely to redress particular violations, but to ensure that government
generally respects constitutional values . .. ").
"s See Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective Justice and Constitutional
Torts, 35 GA. L. REv. 903,906 (2001) (stating that corrective justice demands that persons who
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McKinney significantly diminishes this goal, for there will be some
situations, like Amy's case, in which procedural regularity is
insufficient to prevent a substantive wrong. For example, if the
plaintiff holds a property right guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and the official has violated that right, the
vindication goal of § 1983 calls for the defendant to make the
plaintiff whole. We recognize, of course, that this principle is not
absolute"s because other goals must be accommodated as well.
However, that accommodation is typically and appropriately
accomplished through carefully targeted doctrines like official
immunity, not through absolute denial of the substantive claim.
Turning to the deterrence purpose of § 1983, there are many
legitimate reasons to doubt the efficacy of procedural rules, however
elaborate, as reliable safeguards against executive deprivations of
state-created property rights. 8 ' The key reason is that "[pirocess is
not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a
substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim
of entitlement."'86 Given that the purpose of procedural rights is to
protect substantive rights, foreclosing substantive claims seems to
defeat that purpose. It is pointless to afford procedural protection to
a right whose substance is not worthy of protection by itself.'87
While assuring that fair procedures should diminish the number
of substantive violations, a clever and determined supervisor or local
official can often find a way to conceal improper motives behind a
facade of procedural regularity.' This potential loophole illustrates
were deprived of something without their consent have it returned).
184 See Fallon, supra note 168, at 340 (reviewing Court's holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981)), which "reasoned that the Due Process Clause does not categorically forbid
the states to effect deprivations of liberty and property, but only bars deprivations without due
process of law").
'8 See id. at 343 ("[The assumption that substantive arbitrariness is always traceable to
procedural defects is not always valid.").
188 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 771 (2005) (Souter, J., concurring)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983)).
17 See Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS:
NOMOS XVIII 182, 197 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) ("A decision to
treat a legislatively created benefit program as subject to the constitutional-moral constraints
of due process, while regarding the substance or existence of the program as a matter of
legislative grace, would be simply an unjustifiable anomaly.").
188 Cf Herts v. Smith, 345 F.3d 581,587 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that substantive due
process violation may occur even where procedures are flawless).
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that the accuracy and fairness values that underlie procedural rights
are distinct from the values of vindicating legitimate expectations
and barring badly motivated conduct that generate substantive
rights. We do not rely solely on procedure when the bad motive is
racial or gender bias or retaliation for protected speech. There is no
more reason to do so when it is personal animus, office politics,
bureaucratic obduracy, or incompetence on the part of the decision
maker.
V. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS FOR STATE-CREATED
PROPERTY
We argued in Part III that substantive protection for state-
created property constitutes a third branch of substantive due
process doctrine, despite the Supreme Court's failure thus far to
develop this branch in any detail. Nonetheless, after Engquist and
its narrowing of the class-of-one equal protection theory, the Court
should turn its attention to this aspect of substantive due process.
In this Part, we propose a framework for resolving substantive due
process issues in the state-created property context. We begin by
identifying the principles that govern substantive due process
decisions in other contexts. Then, we apply those principles to the
distinctive features of cases where legitimate expectations give rise
to state-created property.
A. LESSONS FROM THE PERSONAL SECURITY CASES
The most controversial area of substantive due process doctrine
involves challenges to legislation that restricts individual liberty.
Attacks on statutes that criminalize abortion or sodomy fall into this
category." 9 Another branch of the doctrine concerns isolated acts by
officials that directly or indirectly cause physical injury. These cases
start from the premise that the Fourteenth Amendment right of
189 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down state statute
prohibiting homosexual sodomy because statute furthered "no legitimate state interest which
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual"); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,877 (1992) (holding that restrictions on abortion
would be evaluated under "undue burden" standard).
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"liberty" encompasses not only freedom from restraint but also
personal security from harm, and as a result, anyone who is injured
by a government employee has the beginnings of a substantive due
process claim.19 °
Cases dealing with physical harm are not directly relevant to the
scope of substantive protection of state-created property.
Nonetheless, they deserve attention here, if only because we lack
explicit directives from the Supreme Court for the state-created
property context.19' While several differences exist between state-
created property and personal security, they share a common
feature: both involve challenges to a relatively isolated act by a
state actor rather than a challenge to a statute, rule, ordinance, or
procedure. Accordingly, personal security cases provide some
guidance as to the general principles of substantive due process that
apply when dealing with executive actions like dismissing an
employee, canceling a building permit, and other deprivations of
state-created property.
The key feature of personal security cases is that they articulate
a normative theory of substantive due process for encounters
between individuals and the administrative state. In personal
"1 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-18 (1982) (discussing liberty interests in
context of safety, freedom of movement, and training). The "liberty" interests identified in
Youngberg are not derived from state law, but from the common-law tradition. See Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) ("The liberty preserved from deprivation without due
process included the right 'generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' "(quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923))); see also Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and
Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KEN r L. REV. 617,632-33 (1997) (arguing that Ingraham's holding
that Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" included personal security "rests on firmer historical
footing than the artificial Fourth and Eighth Amendment rationales" advanced in other cases).
While liberty interests may also be created by state law, as discussed supra in note 33,
the Court has not had occasion to address the substantive due process limits on state officials
in connection with state-created liberty interests. Cf Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
454 (1985) (holding that prison officials' revocation of prisoner's good time credit "does not
comport with the minimum requirements of procedural due process unless the findings of the
prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record" (emphasis added)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). For a recent application of Hill, see Sira v.
Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 76 (2d Cir. 2004).
... When the property at stake is not state-created but rather the kind of interest
recognized by the common law, the Takings Clause is generally the governing constitutional
provision, and Supreme Court decisions interpreting that clause make up the bulk of the law.
See Merrill, supra note 17, at 957 (discussing Takings Clause and its interaction with common-
law property, eminent domain, and just compensation).
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security cases, the Court identifies the core due process value as a
safeguard against arbitrary action or abuse of power. In Daniels v.
Williams, however, the Court clarified that neither strict liability nor
negligence on the part of officials is sufficient to support substantive
due process liability.'92 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist
explained that the point of substantive due process is "to prevent
governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression. "
193
Thus, negligence cannot suffice for liability because "[flar from an
abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to
measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person."'94 Though
Daniels did not tell us what kind of showing would make out a good
substantive due process claim, it took the critical first step in
developing doctrine in the area.
By identifying "abuse of power" as the core substantive due
process principle in evaluating executive acts,'95 Daniels sets up a
guidepost for resolving substantive due process issues in many
diverse fact patterns. As an example of an application of this
principle to another fact pattern, consider County of Sacramento v.
Lewis.'96 In Lewis, the issue was whether a police officer violated
the plaintiff s substantive due process rights when the officer injured
the plaintiff during a high-speed motorcycle chase with another
person. 97 The Court ruled that "in such circumstances only a
purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest
will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the
conscience, necessary for a due process violation."9' The Court
distinguished from Lewis the question of the standard a pretrial
'92 See 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (holding that liability for "lack of due care" is insufficient
and that such liability "would" trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law); see
also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986) ("[Llack of care simply does not
approach the sort of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was designed
to prevent.").
193 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
194 Id. at 332.
'95 Id. at 330.
196 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
197 Id. at 836.
198 Id.
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detainee must meet in a suit against his jailors for inattention to his
medical needs.'99 That test is "deliberate indifference."2°
The Court explained why it chose different tests for the two types
of cases:
[Aittention to the markedly different circumstances of
normal pretrial custody and high-speed law enforcement
chases shows why the deliberate indifference that shocks
in the one case is less egregious in the other (even
assuming that it makes sense to speak of indifference as
deliberate in the case of sudden pursuit). As the very
term "deliberate indifference" implies, the standard is
sensibly employed only when actual deliberation is
practical, and in the custodial situation of a prison,
forethought about an inmate's welfare is not only
feasible but obligatory under a regime that incapacitates
a prisoner to exercise ordinary responsibility for his own
welfare.2 °'
By contrast, deciding whether to give chase calls for "fast action" and
presents a need to "balance on one hand the need to stop a suspect"
and "on the other, the high-speed threat to all those within stopping
range."202 The decision to give chase therefore lacks the harmful
purpose that implicates a due process violation because the actor
does not have the time to deliberate. 20 ' As a result, what constitutes
an "abuse of power" in isolated executive actions depends in part on
the time the state actor has to make his decision. Thus, when there
is the luxury of time, deliberate indifference constitutes an abuse of
power-whereas situations calling for immediate decisions must
shock the conscience. 0 4
' Id. at 849-50.
'o Id. (citing City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).
201 Id. at 851 (internal citations omitted).
202 Id. at 853.
203 See id. at 853-54 (noting that when circumstances call for "instant judgment," not even
recklessness is sufficient to violate due process).
204 Id. at 852-53.
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B. ISOLATED ACTS AND THE ROLE OF CONTEXT
Lewis, Daniels, and other personal security cases illustrate the
general principle that arbitrariness and abuse of power are key to
establishing a successful substantive due process claim in the
"isolated executive action" context. °5 The Court has also been
sensitive to differences in the balance of state and individual
interests-a balance that depends on the circumstances of a given
encounter. The Court's sensitivity is evident in the distinction it
draws in Lewis between the "deliberate indifference" test for inmates
and the "shock the conscience" test for persons injured in high-speed
chases." 6 The state's interest is stronger when officers must act
quickly, and consequently plaintiffs must meet a higher standard
before liability is imposed on the officer in those cases. The Court
has favored taking a contextual approach rather than attempting to
identify a single all-purpose test. In fact, over a decade ago, Richard
Fallon noted that "no agreed framework ha[d] emerged for
identifying when relatively isolated official acts offend substantive
due process,"" 7 and this remains true today.
The court's contextual approach is wise in light of the variety of
circumstances in which individuals have interactions with the state
205 See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
207 Fallon, supra note 24, at 324. One group of cases that we do not address are those
involving challenges to legislation. Ever since the 1930s, the standard for challenging
legislative acts has been highly deferential. For example, in Harrah Independent School
District v. Martin, the Court upheld the school district's rule that teachers must enroll in
continuing education programs, stating that "[tihe School Board's rule is endowed with a
presumption of legislative validity, and the burden is on [the plaintiff] to show that there is
no rational connection between the Board's action and its conceded interest in providing its
students with competent, well-trained teachers." 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1978).
For other formulations of the test reflecting the Court's deference to legislative acts, see,
for example, Schenck v. City of Hudson, 114 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[A] federal court
may only consider 'whether the legislative action is rationally related to legitimate state ...
concerns.'" (quoting Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1223 (6th Cir. 1992)));
WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Gasconade County, 105 F.3d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[Ihe
ordinance is unconstitutional if it is arbitrary, capricious and not rationally related to a
legitimate public purpose."); and Texas Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095,
1106 (5th Cir. 1996) (providing for rational basis review). See supra notes 168-72 and




and the diversity of interests on either side of that relationship.2 °8
For example, sometimes the state is an employer, as in Roth and
Sindermann, and it has an interest in efficient delivery of
government services. In other cases, the state is a regulator of
businesses or of land use. In still others, it is an educator, a
guardian, or a custodian.
Another line of cases, illustrated by Castle Rock v. Gonzales,"9
involves the state as enforcer of the criminal law. Both the state and
individual interests vary in these contexts. In its enforcement role,
the state, through its agents, often must act quickly, use force, and
make choices as to how to deploy limited resources.210 In its role as
educator, the state may be entitled to deliberately injure someone by
suspending a student from school21' or by inflicting corporal
punishment.212 In contrast, in its role as custodian, the state is
obliged to look out for the welfare of those in its charge.21" Because
of the range of roles the state can assume, no single rule could take
account of the manifold constitutional values at stake in devising
substantive due process principles for all of these relationships.
C. ENFORCING LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
Our concern here is with the distinctive features of cases in which
the plaintiff holds state-created property of some kind-for example,
a job, a building permit, or a liquor license. In the typical case, state
208 It might also be argued that the Court's contextual approach allows it to serve its own
agenda of preventing federal courts from becoming overwhelmed with largely state-law claims.
The Court could accomplish this objective by claiming that deference to the decisions of state
officials prevents it from recognizing the plaintiffs due process claim.
209 545 U.S. 748 (2005). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 64-70 and
accompanying text.
210 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,854 (1998) (finding no liability under
Fourteenth Amendment for unintentional harm caused during high-speed chase).
21 E.g., Butler v. Rancho Rio Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1200-01 (10th Cir.
2003) (upholding school board's decision to suspend student because its decision was not
arbitrary, irrational, or conscience shocking).
212 Compare Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding
that hitting student in eye is excessive force and violates his substantive due process rights),
with Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding five whacks with paddle is
not constitutional violation).
213 E.g., Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079,1083 (llth Cir. 2004) (holding state has duty to ensure
safe environment for children for whom it has assumed responsibility).
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officials have deliberately interfered in some way with the plaintiffs
state-created property, as Joe did when he fired Amy in our
hypothetical. 214 The state's interest as an employer counsels against
constitutional rules that interfere too much with efficient delivery of
government services. At the same time, the state itself has created
a legitimate expectation that Amy will keep her job absent cause for
firing her. Thus, the task-a task the Supreme Court has yet to
squarely confront-is to balance these competing interests by
devising principles for distinguishing between substantive due
process cases in which the plaintiff should prevail and those in
which the state should prevail.
In our view, the core values for a plaintiff in cases of this type are
the plaintiffs expectation and the state-created property interest
that the expectation generates. This expectation gives rise to a
constitutional right on the plaintiffs part to keep his benefit so long
as the expectation of keeping it remains legitimate. For example,
unless there is proof of specific substantive circumstances for firing
Amy (such as incompetence, insubordination, or budgetary
necessity), Joe's dismissal of Amy can fairly be characterized as
arbitrary and an abuse of power under the general principles
developed in the personal security cases.2"5 This conclusion is
implicit in the Court's ruling in Perry v. Sindermann216-that proof
of a property interest "would obligate college officials to grant a
hearing at [plaintiffs] request, where he could be informed of the
grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency."
217
If during her hearing Amy shows the insufficiency of Joe's reasons
for dismissing her, is still fired, and has no further recourse, her Due
Process Clause right to a hearing is rendered meaningless. This
same reasoning applies across the whole range of situations where
214 See supra Part I for hypothetical. Given the general "abuse of power" principle
embodied in Daniels v. Williams, it seems unlikely that a negligent interference with state-
created property could give rise to a substantive constitutional claim under the Due Process
Clause. See 474 U.S. 327, 330 ("[We should not 'open the federal courts to lawsuits where
there has been no affirmative abuse of power.' " (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549
(1981)). In any event, we do not address that issue in our discussion.
215 Conversely, officials should prevail on the plaintiffs substantive claim, even ifthey have
plainly deprived him of property, so long as they can establish that there were good reasons
for the deprivation.
216 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
217 Id. at 603.
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individuals hold state-created property under the legitimate
expectations rationale. The substantive content of the plaintiffs due
process right can be defined by the proof the state offers as to the
illegitimacy of the plaintiffs expectation of retaining the benefit. In
identifying this norm, we recognize that many questions remain.
First, the "legitimate" expectations created by the state in connection
with each benefit that creates property will need to be determined.
Second, our principle that the state must offer proof of a good reason
for the deprivation will oblige courts to determine just how much
proof will be enough. Questions like these cannot be answered in the
abstract, but only in the course of litigation.
D. THE STATE-CREATED PROPERTY CASE LAW
We have drawn on state-created property principles and on
general substantive due process principles to develop a rationale for
substantive protection of state-created property. Only two Supreme
Court decisions-Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing"'
and City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation219-- deal somewhat directly with substantive due process
rights in state-created property. Those cases are not particularly
useful in building the doctrine because the Court's treatment of the
substantive due process issues in them is terse and fragmented.
Nonetheless, these cases are broadly consistent with the approach
we advocate here.
In Ewing, a student was dismissed from the University of
Michigan for academic failure."2 He sued the Regents, claiming,
among other things, "that he had a property interest in his
continued enrollment... and that his dismissal was arbitrary and
capricious, violating his 'substantive due process rights' guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment and entitling him to relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. " 221 The Court assumed both the existence of a state-
created property interest and the availability of a substantive due
218 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
219 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
220 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215.
221 Id. at 217.
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process theory of recovery without deciding that either existed.22 2
The Court went on to say that judges owed great deference to school
administrators.223 They held that the courts may not override the
decision of school faculty unless the decision departed from "accepted
academic norms" so substantially that it evidenced a lack of
"professional judgment."224
Assuming the existence of a property right on the student's part,
the Court's emphasis on professional judgment dovetails neatly with
the legitimate expectations principle. Fitting the Court's "respect for
professional judgment" theme225 into the "protecting legitimate
expectations" framework that we propose, the student's legitimate
expectation in the educational context is not that he or she will
receive grades that an outside arbiter like a judge would approve,
but only that he or she will receive grades that reflect the faculty's
professional judgment.
The most common types of state-created property are jobs,
building plans, business licenses, and other benefits that can only be
taken away for cause. In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye
Community Hope Foundation,226 the Supreme Court assumed the
existence of a state-created property interest in the issuance of a
building permit, which the city took away via a voters'
referendum.227 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor
ruled against the plaintiffs and devoted just a few sentences to the
substantive due process issue.228 She pointed out that the city
222 See id. at 223 ("[Elven if Ewing's assumed property interest gave rise to a substantive
right under the Due Process Clause to continued enrollment free from arbitrary state action,
the facts of record disclose no such action.").
223 Id. at 225.
224 Id. In an earlier case, the Court very briefly addressed a substantive due process claim
when a student challenged her dismissal from medical school on substantive as well as
procedural due process grounds. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978). The Court assumed both the availability of the substantive cause of action and that
the test governing the substantive due process claim was whether the action was "arbitrary
or capricious." Id. at 91. Given these assumptions, the Court held that "no showing of
arbitrariness or capriciousness has been made in this case." Id. at 92. See Bell v. Ohio State
University, 351 F.3d 240, 251 (6th Cir. 2003); and Wright v. Chattahoochee Valley Community
College, No. 3:06-CV-1087-WKW, 2008 WL 4877948, at *5-6 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 12, 2008), for
recent applications of Ewing.
222 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
226 538 U.S. 188, 198 (2003).
2" Id. at 198. See also supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
228 Buckeye, 538 U.S. at 198.
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charter provided for a referendum on such projects if enough
residents signed a petition.2 9 There had been substantial public
opposition to issuance of the permit, which led to a petition for a
referendum; the opinion noted that submitting the building permit
to the voters was "eminently rational."23 ° This ruling can be restated
in terms appropriate to the state-created property context: the
builder had no legitimate expectation that he could avoid a
referendum and the subsequent revocation of his city-issued building
permits.
We do find fault, though, with some of the Court's rhetoric in
Buckeye. Citing Lewis, the Court declared that only "egregious or
arbitrary government conduct" would offend substantive due
process.2"' If the Court meant to import the "shock the conscience"
test from Lewis232 to the state-created property context, then it
seems to us that it ignored the differences we have identified
between high-speed chases and state-created property, or at least
failed to explain why those differences should not matter.233 Our
objection to applying the "shock the conscience" test to state-created
property claims is that legitimate expectations can be disappointed
by actions that do not shock the conscience (under a plausible
understanding of what shocks the conscience). For example, in Herts
v. Smith,234 after finding that a terminated teacher had a property
229 See id. at 192 (noting that petition stayed projects until a vote on the issue).
230 Id. at 199.
231 Id. at 198.
232 See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
3 The opinion is unclear on this point. Justice O'Connor avoided any reference to the
'shock the conscience" test and invoked Lewis only for the proposition that a substantive due
process violation occurs when there has been "egregious or arbitrary government conduct."
Lewis, 538 U.S. at 198-99.
m 345 F.3d 581 (8th Cir. 2003). See also Young v. Twp. of Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 685
(6th Cir. 2006) ("To the extent that a substantive due process claim is available, [plaintiff]
must demonstrate that the Township's decision to terminate his employment had no rational
basis."); Yates v. District of Columbia, 324 F.3d 724, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[Oinly the most
egregious official conduct rises to the level of a substantive due process violation." (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, Tex., 236 F.3d 240, 249
(5th Cir. 2000) (stating that substantive due process analysis is appropriate only in "cases in
which government arbitrarily abuses its power"); Contreras v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 1286,
1295 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that "a plaintiff bringing a substantive due process claim
predicated on a deprived property interest must show . . .that the state's decision was
arbitrary and irrational").
Of course, courts that use this phrase do not always mean the same thing. See
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interest but had received procedural due process, the Eighth Circuit
turned to the teacher's substantive claim.235 Citing Lewis, the court
said the test for deprivation of substantive due process is "whether
the officials acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or so as to
shock the conscience."23 It defined arbitrary and capricious as
"reasons that are trivial, unrelated to the education process, or
wholly unsupported by a basis in fact."237
The holding in Herts is fully consistent with our thesis. The
plaintiffs legitimate expectations in Herts, as in Amy's case,23 would
indeed be disappointed by dismissal based on the kinds of trivial,
irrelevant, or unsupported reasons that the Eighth Circuit
characterized as arbitrary or capricious. 9 It makes sense to focus
on arbitrariness and capriciousness in deciding whether the
government has made a sufficient showing of cause. The point of the
cause constraint is that only certain reasons will suffice for
dismissing the plaintiff, taking away his building permit or
otherwise depriving him of state-created property. If there is little
or no evidence that those reasons are present, or strong evidence
that some impermissible reason drove the decision, then the
Armistead, supra note 109, at 810-14 (explaining inconsistent applications of standard). For
example, in Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 1997), the
court ruled that "alleging that a land use planning decisionmaker does not like the plaintiff,"
and as a result deprived plaintiff ofproperty, did not survive summaryjudgment. We suspect
that other courts would take a different view. Some courts have also required a showing that
state remedies are inadequate. See Contreras, 119 F.3d at 1295. Yet, this approach was
explicitly rejected in Zinermon v. Burch. 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1998).
25 See Herts, 345 F.3d at 587 (discussing substantive due process claim).
23 Id. For similar ways of stating the test, see Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899, 902 (7th
Cir. 2005); Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. ofEduc., 341 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003);
and Wash. Teachers Union Local No. 6 v. Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
237 Herts, 345 F.3d at 587 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similar
language was also used in Fowler v. Smith, 68 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1995), a public employee
dismissal case. In Fowler, the plaintiffhad been fired from his job as director of maintenance
operations of a public school district. Id. at 125. Rejecting his substantive due process
argument, the Fifth Circuit said that "[plublic officials violate substantive due process rights
if they act arbitrarily or capriciously," and that under this standard the defendants would win
if their "action was a rational means of advancing a legitimate government purpose." Id.
at 128. The defendants did not meet that standard because there was evidence that "Fowler
admitted to using a school truck to pull his boat on a weekend trip, kept a pool table in the
maintenance building, stored his boat on school property, drove the school vehicle to pool halls,
and sent school employees on personal errands." Id.
' See supra Part I for Amy's hypothetical case.
2-39 Herts, 345 F.3d at 587.
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plaintiffs legitimate expectations have been disappointed.
Moreover, the phrase arbitrary and capricious is an apt way to
describe the government's conduct." Using that or a similar phrase
to identify the standard will focus attention on the key features of a
given case.241
The concept of conduct that shocks the conscience denotes a more
extreme degree of fault on the part of the defendant. The type of act
sufficient to shock the conscience has been described as one that
"violates the decencies of civilized conduct,"242 is "so brutal and
offensive that it [does] not comport with traditional ideas of fair play
and decency,"243 and is "intended to injure in some way unjustifiable
by any governmental interest."2" Under the framework we propose,
there will be many viable deprivation of state-created property cases
in which the reasons offered by the government actor are trivial,
unrelated, or unsupported by the facts, yet the behavior of the
official will not necessarily shock the conscience.245 Often the
240 See Fallon, supra note 24, at 310 n.8. Giving content to concept of arbitrariness, Fallon
stated that "the intuitive idea is not mysterious: government officials must act on public
spirited rather than self-interested or invidious motivations, and there must be a 'rational' or
reasonable relationship between government's ends and its means." Id.
24 The application of these principles is illustrated by Simi Investment Co. v. Harris
County, 236 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2000). In upholding a substantive due process challenge to the
county's refusal to permit the plaintiff to gain access to a city street adjacent to its property,
the court said that it could "ascertain no rational reason for the County to deny abutting
owners access to the street when the City of Houston now has complete jurisdiction over
Fannin Street." Id. at 251. In support, the court said that the "[m] ost troubling" aspect of the
case was the district court's finding of "an illegitimate plan to benefit the private interests of
Hofheinz-Smith whose properties were financially benefited by the denial of access to the other
properties abutting Fannin Street." Id. The court concluded that "the evidence demonstrates
that the County acted arbitrarily in inventing a park and, thus, acted without a rational basis
in depriving Simi of a constitutionally protected interest." Id.
242 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
m Id. at 847 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
2" Id. at 849.
245 The difficulty of meeting this test is illustrated by Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131 (9th
Cir. 2008). Porter involved the death of the plaintiffs' son who had been lying down in the son's
car in a parking area next to a highway at 2:00 a.m. Id. at 1133. The police were called about
the abandoned vehicle, and Osborn responded to the call. Id. at 1133-34. When the police
approached the car, the son sat up and began to drive away slowly. Id. at 1134. When the son
failed to respond to the officers' commands, one of the officers pepper-sprayed him. Id. As the
son tried to rapidly drive away, an officer shot and killed him. Id. at 1133. The parents
alleged that the responding officer had violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process right of familial association with their now deceased son, and that the officer's
behavior was "so outrageous as to shock the conscience." Id. at 1132. The Ninth Circuit held
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government actor will be shown to have been incompetent or
indifferent rather than indecent, offensive, or malicious."6 Here,
again, we find no fault with the Herts court's reasoning, but only
with the way a careless lawyer may read the opinion. In this regard,
it is worth noting that the Eighth Circuit took care to state its
substantive due process test in the disjunctive, by making "shock the
conscience" one of two alternatives, rather than the touchstone of
liability.247
VI. CONCLUSION: DOES ENGQUIST STAND IN THE WAY?
This Article began with a discussion of Engquist v. Oregon
Department of Agriculture, where the Supreme Court shut the
courthouse door to government employees seeking to bring class-of-
one equal protection challenges to actions taken against them, even
those employees who can convince a jury that they were dismissed
without a rational basis.2" Our aim has been to explore an
underappreciated alternative to the class-of-one suit: a substantive
that Lewis's shock the conscience standard governed the case and stated that the plaintiffs
could only meet the test if they "demonstrate [d] that the officer acted with a purpose to harm
the son that was unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives." Id. at 1137.
246 The test for arbitrariness in the context of disappointing the plaintiffs legitimate
expectations may be compared to the "deliberate indifference" principle of substantive due
process, which is a principle applied to the treatment of persons confined by the state. See
supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text. See also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in
Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 541 (2008)
("Outside the emergency context of high-speed chases or prison riots, courts should apply a
meaningful deliberate-indifference standard to effectively restrain arbitrary, unreasonable
government misconduct.").
In some circuits, the test for arbitrariness has been compared to 'state-created danger"
cases. See King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 812, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2007) (analyzing
circuit courts' three guidelines governing state-created-danger doctrine). For example, in Hunt
v. Sycamore Community School District Board of Education, 542 F.3d 529, 532-33 (6th Cir.
2008), a special education student with a history of violence assaulted a teacher's aide. The
court applied the "deliberate indifference" standard and ruled that this standard would be met
only if the "governmental actor chose to act (or failed to act) despite a subjective awareness of
substantial risk of serious injury" and "did not act in furtherance of a countervailing
governmental purpose that justified taking that risk." Id. at 541. Applying these factors, and
stressing that the plaintiff had "voluntarily undertaken public employment involving the kind
of risk at issue," the court found no substantive due process violation. Id. at 544-45.
247 See Herts v. Smith, 345 F.3d 581, 587 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that substantive due
process rights are violated if officials act in arbitrary or capricious manner or so as to shock
the conscience).
24 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008); see also supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
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due process claim. In proper circumstances, the aggrieved employee
may make a substantive claim under the Due Process Clause that
arbitrary dismissal violates the employee's state-created property
right to keep the post absent cause for termination. Due process
recovery is both broader and narrower than the employee class-of-
one theory rejected in Engquist. It is narrower in that it is available
only to those employees who, under state law, may not be fired
without cause. At-will government employees have no recourse
under the Due Process Clause.249 Yet due process recovery is
broader in that it is available not only to employees, but to anyone
holding state-created property: a building permit, a liquor license,
access to public education.
We have examined objections to the due process approach,
especially those raised by the leading case opposing it, McKinney v.
Pate.250 The considerations raised in McKinney are not sufficiently
compelling to overcome the case for allowing due process recovery."'
Though the Supreme Court has shown some sympathy for the due
process approach, a fair reading of the cases is that the Court has
given the matter little attention. The holding in Engquist, however,
may provide new ammunition to champions of the McKinney
opinion. Chief Justice Roberts's opinion certainly manifests some
reluctance to permit employees to sue for arbitrary dismissal.2
Going forward, a pressing question is whether Engquist threatens
the viability of the substantive due process theory of recovery we
have outlined here.
The answer to that question will depend on which aspects of the
Engquist opinion courts chooses to emphasize in future cases. Some
of the reasoning in Engquist poses problems for substantive due
process litigation. The Court emphasizes the distinction between
the government's relatively weak interest as regulator and its
comparatively strong interest as an employer when exerting its
249 See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976) ("The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel
decisions.").
250 See supra Part II.B.
211 See supra Part III.
22 See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156 ("[An allegation of arbitrary differential treatment
could be made in nearly every instance of an assertedly wrongful employment action.").
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will.25 Hence, the "government has significantly greater leeway in
its dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its
sovereign power to bear on citizens at large."254  This line of
reasoning could be extended to foreclose substantive claims brought
by government employees under the Due Process Clause.
Another possible interpretation of Engquist could extend the
Court's reasoning beyond the employment context, support total
abrogation of the substantive due process theory, and leave plaintiffs
with nothing more than a procedural due process claim. The
underlying reason articulated in Engquist for rejecting class-of-one
equal protection claims of government employees is that
"employment decisions are quite often subjective and
individualized," and "[iut is no proper challenge to what in its nature
is a subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective and
individualized." 2" The "subjective and individualized... principle
applies most clearly" in the employment context.25 By implication,
this principle may also apply to other decisions made by state
government officials. 7
Grounds are available, however, for limiting the reach of
Engquist. First, the Court explicitly confined its holding to the
Equal Protection Clause class-of-one theory, thereby giving itself a
clear basis for declining to extend its holding to claims under the
Due Process Clause and other constitutional provisions.25 Second,
the Court makes clear that, in distinguishing between employment
and regulation, the Court intends to restrict the constitutional rights
associated with at-will employment.259 The substantive due process
theory is only available to plaintiffs who can show that they have
2" See id. at 2151 ("The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and
efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer." (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
254 Id.
2 Id. at 2154.
256 Id. Before applying this principle to the case at hand, the Court declares, without
specific reference to employment, that "[there are some forms of state action ... which by
their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective,
individualized assessments." Id.
2 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
255 See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156 (limiting holding to exclusion of class-of-one theory in
public employment context).
'9 See id. (declining to apply equal protection theory in at-will employment context).
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state-created property interests in jobs or other benefits, not to at-
will employees.26°
There is another reason for cautious optimism that Engquist may
not be extended to preclude substantive due process claims for
deprivations of state-created property. This reason relates to a
weakness in Chief Justice Roberts's rationale for deferring to
government actions that involve discretionary decision making. The
Chief Justice explains that "allowing a challenge based on the
arbitrary singling out of a particular person would undermine the
very discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise."26'
As an example, he uses the case of a traffic officer who observes
many speeders on the highway and who singles out a few of them for
tickets.262 A complaint by a ticketed speeder "does not invoke the
fear of improper government classification," but "rather, challenges
the legitimacy of the underlying action itself-the decision to ticket
speeders in such circumstances."263 Allowing a class-of-one action
here "would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the
challenged action."2" In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
identifies the flaw in this line of reasoning. The unlucky speeder has
no case, because the officer does indeed have a rational basis for
singling out some speeders: "[An officer's] inability to arrest every
driver in sight provides an adequate justification for making a
random choice from a group of equally guilty and equally accessible
violators."265 Here, by contrast, a jury found "that there was no
rational basis for either treating Engquist differently from other
employees or for the termination of her employment."2 6
The problem here is not with an ill chosen hypothetical marring
a basically sound argument. The problem is, as Justice Stevens
pointed out in dissent, that the Engquist majority's rationale ignores
the difference "between an exercise of discretion and an arbitrary
260 For a recent illustration of this distinction, see Miller v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542,
551-53 (3d Cir. 2008).









decision. "267 Discretion is "the power to choose between two or more
courses of action, each of which is thought of as permissible,"26 while
arbitrary decisions are those "unsupported by any rational
basis ... ."269 Six Justices nonetheless voted to eliminate class-of-
one equal protection claims in the employment context. No member
of the majority, however, answered Justice Stevens's objection.
Some of the Justices who joined the majority opinion may well
harbor doubts about the intellectual sturdiness of the thesis
advanced by Chief Justice Roberts. Time will tell whether a
majority of the Court would endorse reasoning similar to that in the
Engquist majority opinion to expunge substantive due process claims
for deprivations of state-created property.
267 id.
266 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
269 Id.
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